Showing posts with label Cheney. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cheney. Show all posts

Friday, October 12, 2007

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND ON 9/11 {masterlist}

National Command Authority
The National Defense Chain of Command in a wartime emergency at the time of the September 11 attacks was: 1) President, 2) Defense Secretary, 3) regional combatant commanders. This was established by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD reorganization Act of 1986, which also allowed that on the whim of the President and Defense Secretary, communications with and oversight of these commanders pass through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS – the nation’s top military officer)

Tightly controlled actions, like issuing an order for fighter jets to shoot down a civilian aircraft, constituted an emergency and had to originate with the President and pass through every link in the chain to the responsible fighter pilots. As the 9/11 Commission explained, “prior to 9/11, it was understood that an order to shoot down a commercial aircraft would have to be issued by the National Command Authority (a phrase used to describe the president and secretary of defense).” [2]

This Chain of Command was not ordinarily needed to get escort fighters off the ground – this could all be done automatically and at intermediate levels, as indicated by the swift fighter response in the Payne Stewart case. These guidelines, in effect since 1986, oddly changed just three months before September 11, with Rumsfeld asserting the sole authority to allow fighters to take off at all. This is covered in more in detail in the post "Muzzling the Defense?"

The 9/11 Commission’s final report later stated in its blameless way: “As they existed on 9/11, the protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORAD required multiple levels of notification and approval at the highest levels of government […] The protocols did not contemplate an intercept […] On the morning of 9/11, the existing protocol was unsuited in every respect for what was about to happen.” It became even more unsuited in the days and hours and even minutes before the attacks, and on the morning of September 11th, strangely, the National Command Authority’s chain of command seemed to sprout new links, swap out old ones, and seemed to not be anchored down to anything. The following posts deal with the US leadership response and the flailings and failings of a Chain of broken links.

- President Bush: “There’s one Terrible Pilot:” The accidental President Stumbles into 9/11.

- Vice President Cheney, the Roadmap Swap, and the “Effort.” Clarifying the Record. Did Bush hand Cheney the joystick to control the attacks?

- Cheney and the Shoot-Down Order: Who issued the order and when? 9:45, 10:14, 10:18?

- Link #2 AWOL: Psychic Rumsfeld’s Wanderings

- Myers the stand-in: How he responds "when things are happening."

- First Day Jitters: Sliney, Leidig, Myers: Three Defense Links Swapped out at the last minute at Joint Chiefs of Staff (ACTING Chairman richard Myers, as of ?:00 am, 9/11) Benedict Sliney at FAA Operations Center (first day as of ?:00 am, 9/11) and Leidig at the NMCC (see chart below - standing in as of 8:30 am, 9/11, as per a request from the previous day). This is spooky.

In the end, what we got was a startlingly "unprepared" and disjointed command authority that ran something like this:

Monday, May 7, 2007

BUSH, CHENEY, AND SECRET SERVICE COMMUNICATIONS

Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
They Let It Happen
last updated 5/7/07


A year after the attack, CNN retold Vice President Cheney’s version of what happened. Cheney was in his proper office in the West Wing when he heard that a plane had crashed into the WTC. Unlike everyone else whose reactions I’ve looked at - with the notable exception of counter-terrorism “Czar” Richard Clarke - Cheney had an inkling this may not be a simple accident. “He watched TV and hoped that his instincts were wrong.,” CNN reported. He explained “it was a clear day, there were no weather problems, and then we saw the second airplane hit in real time. At that moment, you knew this was a deliberate act. This was a terrorist act.” [1]

Shortly after this, his Secret Service agent “all of a sudden materialized right beside me and said, 'Sir, we have to leave now.' He grabbed me and propelled me out of my office, down the hall, and into the underground shelter in the White House." [2] So while, as many noted, the Secret Service was allowing the President to linger in the open at the schoolhouse, they were “propelling” Cheney to safety in an underground bunker. While both men were on the East Coast, they seemed to be operating in two different time zones.

This underground shelter was the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC). From the previously unused but well-equipped PEOC, as CNN explains, the Vice-President “directed the U.S. government's response” to the attack. The actions Cheney took “included moving key members of Congress to a secure location and having the Secret Service bring his wife, Lynn, to the bunker.” [3] Somehow, these radical moves failed to halt the attack.

Cheney and Rice share a tense moment in the PEOC on 9/11. Photo chosen for presence of Cheney on the phone.
Cheney’s account actually offers little in the line of useful action, focusing more on talk of raw emotion – agony and impotence and rage – just like the rest of us – after he saw the second plane hit on the TV - just like the rest of us. But Bush talked to Cheney on a regular cell phone instead of a secure phone, which wasn’t working right. Cheney’s information seemed partial and confused. The 9/11 Commission, based on Cheney’s private testimony, decided Cheney suffered major communications problems that hampered a response. [4] CNN described the PEOC’s performance on 9-11 “a day of crisis with some hitches.” For example, “Cheney wanted to track TV reports of the devastation and listen in on communications with the Pentagon.” But, as aide Mary Matalin recalled, “you can have sound on one or the other and he found that technically imperfect.” [5]

But we know he was in the presence of Secret Service agents during the entire crisis, and the evidence indicates their communication abilities were widespread and efficiently used. Cheney seemed to slip on this once, telling Meet the Press, on September 16 “the Secret Service has an arrangement with the FAA. They had open lines after the World Trade Center was ...” [6] He cut himself off there and shifted gears. What this means is that after the first plane hit, and we would presume soon after, the Secret Service knew, and were listening in on, at least, the FAA’s communications by about 8:50. The second plane was already confirmed hijacked by FAA and NORAD and headed to New York by this time.

Richard Clarke also testified in his book Against All Enemies that at about 9:40, Brian Stafford, Director of the Secret Service “slipped me a note. “Radar shows aircraft headed this way.’” Clarke explained “Secret Service had a system that allowed them to see what FAA’s radar was seeing.” [7] The 9/11 Commission also has backed up direct Secret-Service-FAA communications in their final report. [8] The Secret Service knew all these things and were just a “hey, you!” away from Cheney’s ear and Bush’s.

The communication abilities of the Secret Service also, apparently, extended into the military chain of command, their contacts to the very front lines of the battle. Recall that it was the Secret Service who called the Langley fighter pilots around 9:55 and told them to “protect” the White House (though with no mention of precisely how). [9] They also called Andrews Air Force Base, near the Pentagon, shortly after 9:03 to request fighter jets, which didn’t get any off the ground until 10:42. [10]

Bush's famous shot talking to Cheney from Air Force One
So the Secret Service - and thus both Bush and Cheney - were as in the communications loop as they wanted to be. There was two-way access to all information from FAA, regional Air Force bases, and even the actual fighter pilots, and probably also NORAD, NMCC, etc. So why, with access to a bird’s eye view of the situation and universal communications at Cheney’s and the President’s fingertips, wasn’t an adequate defense marshaled? The story that the phones didn’t work well that day, that Cheney couldn’t talk to the Pentagon and get his intelligence briefings from CNN at the same time, etc. does not pan out well. Something else, probably something sinister, had to be behind this curiously long roster of excuses.

[1], [2], [3], [5] “Cheney recalls taking charge from bunker.” CNN. September 12, 2002. Accessed at: http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/09/11/ar911.king.cheney/
[4] 9/11 Commission Final Report. Page 40.
[6] Thompson and the CCR. "The Terror Timeline." Page 375.
[7] Ruppert, "Crossing the Rubicon." Page 427.
[8] 9/11 Commission Final Report. Page 41.
[9] Thompson and the CCR. "The Terror Timeline." Page 436.
[10] Thompson and the CCR. Page 458.

Saturday, March 3, 2007

CHENEY AND THE SHOOT-DOWN ORDER

White House Conter-terrorism Czar Richard Clarke explained in his account of 9/11 how at 9:30 he told his deputy in the PEOC to inform Vice President Cheney “we need to authorize the Air Force to shoot down any aircraft […] that looks like it is threatening to attack […] Got it?” [1] Accounts differ as to whether or not the vice president “got it” at this point, but Clarke says the shoot-down order was agreed upon by Bush and Cheney some time before the president’s plane took off at 9:55. This was in a call he remembered getting from his deputy with Cheney who informed him “Air Force One is getting ready to take off […] fighter escort is authorized. And […] tell the Pentagon they have authority from the President to shoot down hostile aircraft, repeat, they have authority to shoot down hostile aircraft.” It’s not clear why this aide thought Clarke was a link in the Chain of Command to pass the order on, but Clarke wrote “I was amazed at the speed of the decision coming from Cheney and, through him, from Bush.” [2]

But at least one other account seems to back up an even earlier order. Recall that Cheney was informed of flight 77 closing in on Washington at about 9:33. Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta told the 9-11 Commission in 2003 that he saw Cheney give what he interpreted as a shoot-down order at this time. [3] The BBC documentary Clear the Skies records Mineta’s recollection of a plane reported coming in fast. Cheney was informed it was 30 miles out, and he ordered it shot down. He was informed again that it was 10 miles out and the aide asked if the orders still stood. Mineta recalls “the vice president sort of whipped his head around and said “of course they do.” [4] This account was placed in the documentary, which is based on a ticking timeline of the events, in the time slot right before the Pentagon impact at 9:37.

But the official story is that the order was finally transmitted from the President to Cheney, with a casual “you bet,” at just about 10:05, for sure before 10:10, or maybe 10:18 - this has been hotly contested. The 9-11 Commission, in a rare and curious show of contrariness, got into a bit of a brawl with Cheney over this phone call. In June 2004, as the final report was released, Newsweek reported:

“[S]ome on the commission staff were, in fact, highly skeptical of the vice president’s account and made their views clearer in an earlier draft of their staff report […] some staffers “flat out didn’t believe the call ever took place.” When the early draft conveying that skepticism was circulated to the administration, it provoked an angry reaction […] the White House vigorously lobbied the commission to change the language in its report.” [5]

Cheney and Rice share a tense moment in the PEOC on 9/11. Photo chosen for presence of Cheney on the phone.
The Commission finally caved to Cheney’s protests and simply concluded in their final report “there is no documentary evidence for this call.” But they did get some subtle hints of this earlier argument worked in. For example, they note that neither Cheney’s wife Lynn nor his Chief of Staff Libby, who were nearby, can recall this call being made. [6]

By 10:15, Cheney was ordering a phantom flight shot down, saying the President had “signed-off on the concept.” Cheney’s Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten, Libby’s underling, urged Cheney to “confirm the engage order,” since he “had not heard any prior conversation on the subject with the President.” [7] This confirmation call, unlike the first, was logged at 10:18 and found by the commission. The final report also notes that Bush informed Press Secretary Fleischer at 10:20 that he had just passed on the historical shoot-down order.

The clear but subtle implication is that perhaps Cheney issued this order on his own and only ran it by Bush at 10:18 – or at least Libby, Lynn, Bolten, and the 9/11 Commission have made it look that way, for reasons that are unclear. But Bush stubbornly insists standard procedure was observed, and that he passed the order on whenever Cheney says he did. He said this in the secret hearing he had with the commission in Cheney’s presence, not under oath, off the record, with no recordings, minutes, or direct quotes allowed. They summed up Bush’s recollection:

“The President said he remembered such a conversation, and that it reminded him of when he had been an interceptor pilot. The President emphasized to us that he authorized the shootdown of hijacked aircraft.” [8]

Much has been made of Cheney’s aggressive application of the shoot-down order once he finally had it. In an incident eerily similar to Mineta’s recollection cited above, Cheney urged the shoot-down of United 93 as it was reported closing in at about 10:10. This was read by the Secret Service as a radar track, but, the Commission concluded, was actually a projection of 93’s path if it ,hadn’t just crashed. But it gave Cheney a chance to do something. Informed the plane was eighty miles out, Cheney quickly “authorized fighter aircraft to engage the inbound plane.” Again he was informed when the projected plane was 60 miles out and wanted to know if the order still stood. “Scooter” Libby described Cheney’s confirmation to the 9-11 Commission as swift - “in about the time it takes a batter to decide to swing.” [9] But he only started swinging almost the exact minute there was nothing left to swing at, giving an impression of decisive leadership without actually screwing up a perfectly good terror attack.

Besides the vague possibility of ordering the shoot-down of 93 without the Presiden't approval, another Cheney contribution to the 9/11 mythos is his instant response to the plane's crash. Once it became clear that 93 had gone down short of Washington, everyone wondered if it had been shot down. Yet without any of the evidence that would later surface from the audio record of the doomed flight’s last moments, without the benefit of having heard anyone cry “let’s roll,” Cheney already knew the official story. “The Vice President was a little bit ahead of us,” said Eric Edelman, Cheney's national security advisor. “He said sort of softly and to nobody in particular, ‘I think an act of heroism just took place on that plane.’” [10] What an eerily acurate guess.

[1] Clarke, Richard A. “Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror.” New York. Free Press. 2004. Page 7.
[2] Thompson, Paul and the Center for Cooperative Research. "The Terror Timeline: Year by Year, Day by Day, Minute by Minute." New York. Regan books. 2004. Page 431.
[3] See [2]. Thompson. Page 431.
[4] "Clear the Skies." BBC Video. 2002.
[5] Klaidman, Daniel and Michael Hirsh. “Who was Really in Charge?” Newsweek. June 28, 2004.
[6] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. Authorized First Edition. New York. W.W. Norton. 2004. Pages 40-41
[7] See [5]. Klaidman and Hirsh.
[8] See [6]. Page 40.
[9] See [6]. Page 41
[10] CNN. “Cheney recalls taking charge from bunker.” September 12, 2002. Accessed at: http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/09/11/ar911.king.cheney/

Monday, February 12, 2007

ROADMAP SWAP/CHENEY’S “EFFORT”

BEFORE AND AFTER MAY 8: CLARIFYING THE RECORD
Adam Larson
Caustic Logic/They Let It Happen
December 17 2006


Office of What?
Cheney_Sinister
Dick Cheney: behind the scenes = behind it all? Who could NOT suspect that face?
There has been much attention and much confusion within the 9/11 Truth community centered on the mysterious mid-2001 “counter-terrorism task force” headed by Vice President Cheney and its possible role in the 9/11 attacks. From this has emerged three main takes: the passive LIHOP (Let it Happen on Purpose), active LIHOP (scramble defense on 9/11), and MIHOP (Make It Happen on Purpose) interpretations, each with their variations.

- Basic gist for a passive LIHOP theorist: Bush creates a task force to “prevent” terrorist attacks, tasking it to Cheney, whose pals want a “New Pearl Harbor.” Cheney gets the staff going just one day before 9/11 and so it fails to prevent the attack. Cheney’s stalling prevented implementation of previously recommended measures that could have stopped the 9/11 hijackers on the ground and so is evidence of allowance, which was also alleged – if not proven - over the original Pearl Harbor attack.

- Active LIHOP: In addition to maybe leaving the door open to the terrorists, Cheney prepared the field for the attack by scheduling several air-based military war games, some of which had fighter jets sent far away from the East Coast, and others whose similarity to the attack confused air defenses.

- Basic MIHOP (Make it Happen on Purpose) interpretation: Cheney used this task force to “prepare” for the attack by mobilizing FEMA Urban Search and Rescue teams to Manhattan the night before, presumably to facilitate evidence removal after the demolitions. And he arranged the war games, whose programming and possibly “live-fly” drones may have actually carried out the attack rather than just opening the skies. The “worst fears” being prepared for came true, and Cheney probably coordinated it all through his task force and an unidentified “Maestro.”

While all three and their various derivative theories are intriguing and have their evidence, I have a strong case to argue that these theories are seriously flawed. I myself was suckered in to the particular MIHOP interpretation at one point, seeing in it a neat way to tie the reviled Dick Cheney in with the war games of 9/11 and even the deployment of the FEMA rescue workers allegedly in Manhattan the night before the attack. Mike Ruppert was pushing the first half of that (but decidedly not the second), and it seemed intriguing and quite plausible. But the more research I do, the less clear all these links become. It’s not to say they aren’t there, just that if they are they aren’t as in the open as people seem to think. After I cover the flaws with both the LIHOP and MIHOP takes, I’ll propose a third interpretation of the import of this elusive agency.

There is a lot of confusion around the issue, enough so that people don’t even agree on what precisely to call the thing: Gregor Holland, in a 2004 piece from the New Zealand site Scoop (and later re-run by Prison Planet), explained that “the Office for Domestic Preparedness was the effort assigned to Dick Cheney by George W. Bush on May 8, 2001.” [1] But The Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), which Holland correctly cites as an entity within U.S. Department of Justice, was actually created at DoJ in 1998 “to develop and administer training and equipment assistance programs for state and local emergency response agencies.” [2] The Center for Cooperative Research got it much closer, reporting in their timeline “May 8, 2001: Bush entrusts Vice President Cheney to head the new Office of National Preparedness, a part of FEMA.” [3] A 2002 House of Representatives report made no mention of a Cheney role in Bush’s creation of the Office of National Preparedness (ONP) on May 8 “for greater coordination among federal agencies in responding to a terrorist attack." They also noted "the President located the ONP within FEMA,” not in the White House. [4]

Bush’s original May 8 order stated the ONP “will be responsible for implementing the results of those parts of the national effort overseen by Vice President Cheney that deal with consequence management.” [5] The ONP were the front line water carriers to implement Cheney’s findings, and so there was clearly a higher level than them where these decisions were made, based not at FEMA but in the White House. As far as I can tell, this has no name, most commonly referred to as the “effort” that was indeed tasked to Cheney on May 8. It was neither ODP or ONP. The 9/11 Commission referred to this vaguely as “an effort looking at preparations for managing a possible attack by weapons of mass destruction and at more general problems of national preparedness.” [6] “Looking at” means a committee-oriented review process to give the ONP its direction, so I call this higher level “Cheney’s effort” or “the effort.”

The Roadmap Swap and the LIHOP take
Before I relate more on the May decree, we need to understand the timing “coincidence” I call “the Roadmap Swap.” It began on January 31 2001: Bush was just sworn-in as the 43rd President, with Cheney and all the PNAC people looking for their “new Pearl Harbor” on his coattails. That day, an elite panel was just completing its own assessment of the threat of such catastrophic events in the coming decades: The U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century. Created by President Clinton and House Speaker Newt Gingrich in 1998, and co-chaired by former Senators Gary Hart (D) and Warren Rudman (R), the commission unveiled their new report “Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for Change” at a press conference. Among the excerpts read live by Gary Hart on January 31 2001 was this ominous prophecy:

“States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction, and some will use them [...] Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers. […] Our military superiority will not entirely protect us” [7]

According to Hart, Congress began to take the commission’s suggestions seriously in March and April, and started introducing legislation to implement some of the recommendations, one of which was the creation of something called a “Homeland Security Department.”” [8] The commission scheduled another meeting for May 7, hoping some administration officials would attend this time. Instead, the meeting was cancelled and replaced with a brand-new policy review process. Hart said of the ultimate end of his commission “frankly, the White House shut it down […] The President said ‘please wait, we’re going to turn this over to the Vice President.” [9]

As National security Adviser Rice later explained, “The vice president was later, I think in May, tasked by the president to put together a group to look at all of the recommendations [from] the Gilmore report and the Hart-Rudman report and so forth and to try to make recommendations about what might have been done.” [10] This is where the May 8 decree comes in, apparently timed to answer the questions raised by the cancellation of Hart-Rudman’s scheduled meeting the previous day, and Bush’s statement seemed to address what they had probably meant to talk about. “No governmental responsibility is more fundamental than protecting the physical safety of our nation and its citizens,” the one-page release stated, so “I have asked Vice President Cheney to oversee the development of a coordinated national effort so that we may do the very best possible job of protecting our people from catastrophic harm.” Bush explained that the responses to a successful WMD attack were widely tasked to various agencies, a recipe for disaster. He expressed the need for these responses to become “seamlessly integrated, harmonious, and comprehensive.” [11] The release offers very little insight into Cheney’s role, mostly dedicated to explaining the new ONP, which Bush asked FEMA Director Joe Allbaugh to create.

Much has been made of the relevance of this swap, comparing the slow pace of Cheney’s effort compared to the urgency recommended by the Hart-Rudman Commission. Paul Thompson concluded in The Terror Timeline (2004) that the January report put forth fifty suggestions to "stop terrorists inside the US,” but every one was “ignored by the Bush administration.” Former Senator Gary Hart (D) later implied to Salon in April 2004 that the ONP/Cheney effort was created to prevent Congress from acting on his commission’s findings – though the purpose was left unexplained. [13] Apparently Al Franken made a big deal of satirically calling the Bush response to the Hart-Rudman plan “Operation Ignore.” Dave Pierre at the “Frankenlies” website took issue with this: “Franken leads many readers to believe that the commission’s report was some urgent call for President Bush to revamp the entire national security infrastructure immediately,” and that their refusal to do so may have contributed to 9/11. But Pierre aptly pointed out that “the Commission’s report clearly took a long-range outlook on how the United States should approach its national security," specifically, over 25 years. "In fact, the commission wrote, ‘We propose significant change, and we know that change takes time.’” [14]

In other words, if the roadmap swap really was meant as a delaying operation, either to deny a bi-partisan plan in favor of the Cheney/PNAC model, or to keep the road to 9/11 unobstructed - it was hardly needed. No recommendations were really expected except in the span of years and election cycles, not four-month cycles. If the Commission’s plans had been allowed to run their course, 9/11 would still have occurred. Scratch the passive LIHOP take, Cheney’s effort has nothing to do with it.

Hands-On Management?
Then to the active LIHOP and MIHOP interpretations: The few mainstream reports I’ve seen paint Cheney's effort as strictly paper-pushing review, but many in the Truth movement see something more sinister. For example, in Crossing the Rubicon, Mike Ruppert takes the stance that this task force put Cheney in “a quiet but unequivocal hands-on management role, before, during, and after 9/11.” He flatly asserts that the May 8 Order “placed Dick Cheney in charge of planning, preparing for, and coordinating all US response to the terror attack,” response that went well beyond FEMA ground response to the strikes and up into the military level of the air defense. [15] Considering the aberrantly poor response that then happened four months later, this is a damning charge.

I have respect for Ruppert’s works and have in the past considered myself a fan, but in this case at least I’m not so sure he has adequate evidence to back up this claim. For example, Ruppert decided the order tasked Cheney’s effort with coordinating “planning and training” against terror threats, a central part of his linking Cheney with the war games of 9/11, at least one of which posed a hijacking threat. But the release actually tasks the ONP, not Cheney, with “planning, training, and equipment needs” of local first responders, and placed naither in charge of scheduling war games.

So the nation's response to a WMD attack was to be looked at, tinkered with, and perhaps indirectly run by the enigmatic Dick Cheney - shortly after his colleagues at the PNAC had noted the utility of a “catastrophic and catalyzing event, like a new Pearl Harbor.” Four months later the worst terrorist (non-WMD) attack in Human history occurred, seamlessly sliding through all defenses and causing catastrophic (and catalyzing) harm to the American people, with a death toll on par with the “old” Pearl Harbor. While all this seems somewhat beyond the realm of coincidence, especially considering the relative rapidity of these events lining up within one year, to imply direct connections between them at this point seems premature. In the days before the attack, the coincidences would only get more precise and chilling, but not necessarily more relevant.

Abbot Helms “The Effort”
Adm Steven Abbot
Admiral Steven Abbot, Director of Cheney's "effort," in October 2001
The 9/11 Commission explained that after the May 8 announcement creating Cheney’s effort and the ONP “the next few months were mainly spent organizing the effort and bringing an Admiral from the Sixth Fleet back to Washington to manage it.” [16] Cheney's first hire in June was his point man on coordinating the effort, Navy Admiral Steven Abbot, who has now become one of Mike Ruppert’s “persons of interest” in 9/11. He is a Rhodes scholar with an impressive military career, being a top commander in Europe during the conflict in Kosovo, and just retired as he got his new call to duty. Cheney also hired an embryonic staff of two to assist Abbot: researcher Carol Kuntz, who started her review right away, and Col. John Fenzel III, formerly director of Cheney’s secretive Energy Task Force and now Abbot’s staff director. [17] They were to report to Congress on their findings by October 1, a deadline that must have seemed impossible as September dawned and they still had no staff to direct and no base to operate from.

The 9/11 Commission reported “the Vice President’s task force was just getting under way when the 9/11 attack occurred.” [18] In fact Abbot, Fenzel and Kuntz were finally given White House security clearance and got to work on the day before the fateful attack. [19] Abbot told the Congressional Quarterly in 2004 “I didn’t begin to work full time [on the effort] until early September. I got my pass to the White House complex on the 10th of September.” [20] What, if anything, did this staff do in the next 24 hours?

While Abbot’s official job was purely review – that is, research and recommendation - he did bring his connections and his many skills to the table. Ruppert found that Abbot was a trained fighter pilot, insanely experienced with a variety of craft, routinely hired as a test pilot for new technologies, and generally one with supreme understanding of managing the air dimension. Thus, Ruppert reasoned, Abbot may be an excellent candidate for Maestro, the coordinator of air-based exercises on 9-11 that “jump-started” response to the attack. [21]

Ruppert claims Abbot had also previously been in charge of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) beneath the Pentagon, the war room that sat empty of leadership on 9/11 while Rumsfeld and Myers ignored the attack. The acting NMCC Director that morning had been Captain Charles Leidig, asked to stand-in the day before for 90 of the 111 minutes of the 9/11 attack. Both having been from the Navy, Ruppert wondered “if Leidig and Abbot had ever served together or if Abbot had any influence in Leidig’s placement in the NMCC,” a placement which was, after all, requested bare hours after Abbott punched in for his first day of work at the White House. [22] No matter what to make of it all, this Cheney-Abbott-Leidig seam sewn into the fabric of the 9/11 story just about 24 hours before the actual attack is a highly curious and intriguing coincidence and makes Ruppert’s overall case start to make sense.

It's also worth noting that Abbot’s whereabouts and actions during the attack have not been publicized as far as I’ve seen. He was not questioned by the 9/11 Commission in any of their twelve public hearings, and was not even mentioned by name in their final report, referred to only as “an admiral from the Sixth Fleet,” (his name is in the footnote for this, citing a previously existing book by Steven Brill.) The Commission either never asked after him or he never returned their calls. As the man leading Cheney’s new preparedness task force, to be absent from all accounts as the biggest lack of preparedness in history happens on his second day on the job – and to remain unquestioned and virtually unnamed - that’s certainly anomalous, and raises the question of what skill set he was really using that morning.

A Post-9/11 Script Written in a Pre-9/11 World
While all this is speculation, what is known is that the attack gave Abbot and some of those around him a quick promotion; Cheney’s effort was the seed that would become the previously recommended Homeland Security Department. A White House spokeswoman later stated “the president was able to very quickly after September 11 stand up the Office of Homeland Security [since] a great deal of work had already been put into this issue.” [23] This was mainly the work that Carol Kuntz had overseen in mid-2001, and even in retrospect looks like a logical follow off of the Hart-Rudman Commission’s recommendations. Thus it should not be surprising that a White House press release from October 29 announced that Abbot was being promoted to the new Office of Homeland Security, as its Deputy Director, directly under Tom Ridge. [24]

So essentially what happened is previous ideas on securing the homeland were taken in together by Cheney’s effort, reviewed by Abbot’s crew, and, after the attack that clarified its need, used to set up the Office of Homeland Security and eventually DHS. Thus on May 8, Bush essentially tasked Cheney to create the Department of Homeland Security, which wouldn’t even make enough sense to do outright until after 9/11. This may be a coincidence, as the government certainly would argue if asked, but it is a rather spooky seam of foresight I think. Thus far it’s been largely eclipsed by these charges that Cheney’s effort was precisely the mechanism for allowing or orchestrating the attacks. It was probably no more responsible than its counterpart the USA PATRIOT Act, also clearly written before 9/11 considering its haste of production and signing into law as soon as it made sense - one month after the attacks, and a few days after the Anthrax Scare that had cleared capitol Hill.

Recall as well that a plan for the war in Afghanistan and a global campaign against al Qaeda was placed on Bush’s desk September 9. According to Paul O’Neill and others, the war in Iraq was largely planned before 9/11. The Patriot Act was written, and as we’ve just seen, the skeleton at least of the DHS was set up shortly before 9/11 as well. These are facts, and whether Bush gave Cheney the joystick to control the actual attacks or not, the general thrust of the Post-9/11 world was already set. You tell me: what does effort thusly directed in the months between Bush’s coronation and the “catalyzing event” really imply? Let It Happen? Make It Happen? Or simply It Will Happen?

Sources:
[1] Holland, Gregor. "UQ Wire: Long Debunked Rumor Validated by Giuliani: FEMA in NYC prior to 9-11 for Project TRIPOD terror drill, scheduled for 9-12." Scoop, Independent News. June 3 2004. http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0406/S00031.htm
[2] "Office for Domestic Preparedness." Federation of American Scientists. http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/ojp/index.html
[3], [13] "Profile: Office of National Preparedness." Center for Cooperative Research. http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/entity.jsp?entity=office_of_national_preparedness
[4] The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, & Emergency Management Hearing on The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Office of National Preparedness. April 11 2002.
http://www.house.gov/transportation/pbed/04-11-02/04-11-02memo.html
[5], [11] "Statement by the President: Domestic Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction." For Immediate Release, Office of the Press Secretary. May 8, 2001. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010508.html
[6] 9/11 Commission Final Report, page 40.
[7] US Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century, (1999), p. 141
[8] Paul Thompson and the center for Cooperative Research. The Terror Timeline. 2004. Page 98.
[9] See [8] Page 89.
[10] NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES Ninth Public Hearing
Thursday, April 8, 2004 Hart Senate Office Building Washington, DC CHAIRED BY: THOMAS H. KEAN
http://news.lp.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/911comm40804tran.html
[12] McCaleb, Christopher. "Disaster agency to coordinate terrorism response." CNN. May 8, 2001. http://archives.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/05/08/senate.terrorism.02/
[14] "Operation Ignore"? Someone is ignoring some facts." http://www.frankenlies.com/lies/commission.htm
[15] Ruppert, Michael C. Crossing the Rubicon. 2004. Page 412.
[16] 9/11 Commission Final Report, Page 204.
[17], [20], [23] Rood, Justin. "Cheney Task Force on Terrorist Threats Never Met Before Attacks." Congressional Quarterly. April 15, 2004. http://page15.com/2004/04/cheney-task-force-on-terrorist-threats.html
[18] 9/11 Commission Final Report, page 204.
[19] See [8]. Page 106.
[21] See [15]. Pages 418-421.
[22] See [15]. Page 420
[24] “Gov. Ridge names Deputy Director of Homeland Security.” White House Press Release. October 29, 2001. Accessed August 5, 2005 at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011029-6.html